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Abstract
Generations of social scientists have explored whether males and females act differently in domains involving competition,
risk taking, cooperation, altruism, honesty, as well as many others. Yet, little is known about gender differences in the trade-off
between objective equality (i.e., equality of outcomes) and efficiency. It has been suggested that females are more equal
than males, but the empirical evidence is relatively weak. This gap is particularly important, because people in power of
redistributing resources often face a conflict between equality and efficiency. The recently introduced Trade-Off Game (TOG)
– in which a decision-maker has to unilaterally choose between being equal or being efficient – offers a unique opportunity to
fill this gap. To this end, I analyse gender differences on a large dataset including N=6,955 TOG decisions. The results show
that females prefer objective equality over efficiency to a greater extent than males do. The effect turns out to be particularly
strong when the TOG available options are “morally” framed in such a way to suggest that choosing the equal option is the
right thing to do.
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1 Introduction
After the 2016 Central Italy earthquake, which destroyed
dozens of small mountain villages, killed hundreds of peo-
ple, and left tens of thousands of other people homeless, the
Italian Government found itself in the middle of a funda-
mental conflict. MPs had to decide in which areas to build
temporary houses to host the survivors who had lost their
houses. These temporary accommodations were meant to
host the survivors for a relatively long time, estimated to
about 10 years, while waiting for the reconstruction of their
houses. For this reason, the survivors had a strong pref-
erence for having these temporary houses built as near as
possible to where they used to live before the quake. The
conflict emerged because this “equal” solution, which would
have satisfied all the survivors to the same extent, was im-
practicable from the Government point of view: eliminating
the rubbles in a reasonable time frame, reaching nearly in-
accessible mountain villages with the trucks, and build, in
each of these villages, a relatively small number of houses
(some of these villages had only 20 inhabitants), would have
exponentially inflated the cost and the time needed for the
intervention. From the point of view of the Government,
the most “efficient” solution was to select one single area
and build all the temporary houses in this area. However,
this solution was perceived to be highly unequal from the
survivors: it would have satisfied some of them (those who
Copyright: © 2020. The authors license this article under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
∗Middlesex University London. Email: V.Capraro@mdx.ac.uk.
happened to live near the selected area), and it would have
dissatisfied others (those who happened to live far).
This is only one example of the tension between equality
and efficiency. A more classical case is taxation: according
to Okun’s “leaky bucket” argument, taxation is inefficient,
as administering the tax has a cost for the institution im-
plementing the tax (Okun, 2015). The problem is, in fact,
much deeper and relies in the often-unavoidable discrepancy
between the natural and the equal distributions of resources:
the natural distribution of resources is often unequal, and cre-
ating equality is often costly. This generates a fundamental
conflict between equality and efficiency. People in power of
resource distribution often face this conflict. For this reason,
understanding what individual factors affect this trade-off is
a problem of primary importance across social sciences. In
this paper, I focus on one particular but important factor: the
gender of the decision maker.
Why gender? On the one hand, Choshen-Hillel and Yaniv
(2011) and Choshen-Hillel and Yaniv (2012) have developed
and tested a theory according to which people’s relative pref-
erence for equality or social welfare depends on their level
of agency, that is, “the capacity, condition, or state of acting
or of exerting power” (Webster’s dictionary): agentic peo-
ple tend to prefer efficiency over equality to a greater extent
than non-agentic people do. On the other hand, social role
theorists have long argued that males are, on average, more
agentic than females (Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Wood, 1999).
Putting these two observations together suggests that males
should tend, on average, to prefer efficiency over equality to
a greater extent than females do. Here, I test this hypothesis
in the domain of “objective equality”.
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1.1 Principles of equality
Social scientists have been debating about what it means to
distribute resources in an equal manner for decades, giving
rise to several theories of equality.
One useful classification has been proposed by Eckhoff
(1974), according to which there are five basic principles of
equality: objective equality, refers to a situation in which
each recipient receives the same amount; relative equality
(often called equity), refers to a situation in which each recip-
ient receives in proportion of their input; subjective equality
refers to a situation in which each recipient receives in pro-
portion to their needs; rank order equality refers to a situation
in which each recipient receives in proportion to their status
and position; equality of opportunity refers to a situation in
which all recipients are put in the same conditions to reach
a goal. See Cook & Hegtvedt (1983) for a review.
Although I acknowledge the importance and relevance of
all principles of equality, in this paper I will be concerned
only with the first one, objective equality. Although lim-
ited, this notion of equality is particularly relevant in many
real-life situations, specifically those in which the recipients
are virtually indistinguishable. Not surprisingly, the notion
of objective equality is the one that has been studied the
most by economists. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) introduced
a utility function according to which people get a disutility
any time their monetary payoff is above or below the pay-
off of other players. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) studied a
utility function according to which people have a preference
for receiving a payoff as close to the average payoff as pos-
sible. Although these two utility functions make different
predictions in case of three (or more) players (Engelmann
& Strobel, 2004), they both predict that players receive a
disutility every time their monetary payoff departs from the
objectively equal distribution of money.
1.2 Literature review
This work explores gender differences in the trade-off be-
tween objective equality and efficiency.
Generally speaking, gender differences in human be-
haviour have attracted generations of social scientists, who
have used economic games to explore whether males and
females act differently in a number of domains, including
competition (Gneezy, Niederle & Rustichini, 2003; Niederle
& Vesterlund, 2007; Gneezy, Leonard & List, 2009), risk
taking (Powell & Ansic, 1997; Byrnes, Miller & Schafer,
1999; Charness &Gneezy, 2012), cooperation (Rand, 2017),
altruism (Engel, 2011; Rand et al., 2016; Brañas-Garza et
al., 2018), honesty (Capraro, 2018; Gerlach, Teodorescu
& Hertwig, 2019; Abeler, Nosenzo & Raymond, in press),
as well as many others (Sunden & Surette, 1998; Croson
& Gneezy, 2009; Friesdorf, Conway & Gawronski, 2015).
Yet, relatively little is known about gender differences in the
trade-off between objective equality and efficiency.
A set of previous studies looked at the development of
preferences for objective equality and efficiency from child-
hood to adolescence. The starting point of this literature is
the observation that children develop preferences for objec-
tive equality quite early in their lives (Blake & McAuliffe,
2011; Shaw & Olson, 2012), but adults tend to prefer ef-
ficiency over objective equality (Charness & Rabin, 2002;
Engelmann & Strobel, 2004; Capraro, Smyth, Mylona &
Niblo, 2014). In agreement with this view, several authors
have observed a decrease in objective equality preferences
from 8 to 19 years old, accompanied by an increase in effi-
ciency considerations (Fehr, Glätzle-Rützler & Sutter, 2013;
Martinsson, Nordblom, Rützler & Sutter, 2011; Meuwese,
Crone, de Rooij & Güroğlu, 2015), as well as in relative
equality (Almås, Cappelen, Sørensen & Tungodden, 2010).
Interestingly, this increase in efficiency considerations from
childhood to adolescence appears to be stronger for boys
than for girls (Almås et al, 2010; Martinsson, Nordblom,
Rützler & Sutter, 2011; Meuwese et al. 2015). Since little
girls and little boys have similar preferences for objective
equality (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; Shaw & Olson, 2012),
this differential development of preferences for efficiency
from childhood to adolescence suggests that adult females
might end up preferring objective equality over efficiency to
a greater extent than adult males do.
However, a series of experiments, from different research
groups and using different empirical techniques, provide
only weak evidence for this hypothesis. Dickinson and
Tiefenthaler (2002) let participants make a series of deci-
sions about how to divide resources among three players.
These resources would lead to different monetary payoffs.
Among the available resource allocations, three of them
were particularly salient: one allocation corresponded to
the equal distribution of resources; one option corresponded
to the equal allocation of monetary payoffs; one allocation
corresponded to the maximum total monetary payoff. Dick-
inson and Tiefenthaler found that females were more likely
than males to choose the distribution of resources that cor-
responded to the equal monetary payoff. Choshen-Hillel
and colleagues have explored the trade-off between objec-
tive equality and efficiency in several works (Choshen-Hillel
& Yaniv, 2011; Choshen-Hillel & Yaniv, 2012; Choshen-
Hillel, Shaw & Caruso, 2015; Shaw, Choshen-Hillel and
Caruso, 2016; Choshen-Hillel, Lin & Shaw, 2019). How-
ever, they did not report gender differences.1 Kariv, Lee, List
and Price (2016) conducted a set of modified dictator game
experiments with varying price of giving and where the re-
cipient is a charity chosen by the dictator. The authors did
1Choshen-Hillel has confirmed in a private conversation that they also
find that females are more likely than males to choose the objectively equal
allocation of money. Therefore, their results are consistent with those
presented in the current work.
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not explicitly pit objective equality against efficiency, but,
in their structural model, they estimated a parameter 휚 that
was meant to take into account this trade-off. They found no
gender differences in this parameter. Stieglitz, Gurven, Ka-
plan and Hopfensitz (2017) studied gender differences in the
trade-off between objective equality and efficiency among
Tsimane spouses.2 They found that females tended to be less
social welfare maximising only when distributing money,
and not when distributing meat. Moreover, this gender dif-
ference in money distribution was not driven by increased
concern for objective equality, but from increased concern
for altruism. Olschewski, Dietsch and Ludvig (2019) have
a treatment in which objective equality is pitted against effi-
ciency, but they do not report the effect of gender.
Other papers have explored gender differences in resources
distribution, using choices that do not directly pit objective
equality against efficiency. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001)
conducted a series of dictator game experiments with vary-
ing cost-to-benefit ratio. In doing so, they found that, when
the benefit of the altruistic action is greater than its cost
(and thus it maximises efficiency), males give more than fe-
males; conversely, when the benefit of the altruistic action is
smaller than its cost, males give less than females. Herne and
Suojanen (2004) let participants choose among four differ-
ent alternatives, an utilitarian one (which maximises average
and total payoff), a Rawlsian one (which maximises the floor
payoff), and two mixed distributions, one with maximum
average payoff and constant range, and one with maximum
average payoff and constant floor). Males were more likely
to choose the utilitarian choice, while females were more
likely to choose the Rawlsian one. Fehr, Naef and Schmidt
(2006) analysed gender differences in situations in which the
decision-maker has to choose between three allocations of
money: one that maximises efficiency, one that minimises
inequality (but it is not objectively equal), and one that max-
imises the payoff of the worse-off player. Females were
more likely than males to choose the option that minimises
inequality. Martinsson, Nordblom, Rützler and Sutter (2011)
found that females were more difference averse than males,
whereas males were more socially efficient; however, in their
study, objective equality is not pitted against efficiency. Du-
rante, Putterman and Van der Weele (2014) implemented
a tax-game in which participants had to choose which tax
to implement in a group of twenty tax-payers. They con-
ducted several treatments and found that, overall, females
were more pro-redistribution than males, even when redis-
tribution is associated to an efficiency loss. However, in
their baseline, they found no significant gender differences,
but only a slight trend, according to which the average tax
implemented by females was 4 percentage points higher than
the average tax implemented by males. Kamas and Preston
(2015) conducted an experiment in which subjects had to
2Tsimane is a semi-sedentary forager-horticulturalist population that
lives in the Amazon in Bolivia.
choose among three alternatives. They classified subjects
into “self-interested”, “inequity averse”, and “total social
surplus maximisers”. They found no gender differences in
self-interest, but they found that females were more likely
to be inequity averse and males were more likely to be to-
tal social surplus maximisers. However, also in this case,
inequity aversion did not coincide with objective equality.
Cetre, Lobeck, Senik and Verdier (2019) conducted an ex-
periment in which participants had to choose between two
projects that brought different monetary payoffs. They found
that females were less likely to choose the high inequality
but efficient project, compared to men, but only when they
had to choose under the veil of ignorance. As in the previ-
ous cases, none of the allocations corresponded to objective
inequality.3
In summary, while previous research seems to be in line
with the view that adult females prefer objective equality to a
greater extent than adult males do, the evidence is relatively
weak and further work is needed to test this hypothesis.
1.3 The present research
Here I report the largest-to-date test of gender differences in
the trade-off between objective equality and efficiency.
Imeasure the trade-off between objective equality and effi-
ciency using the recently introduced Trade-Off Game (TOG;
Capraro and Rand, 2018; Tappin & Capraro, 2018). In the
TOG, one decision-maker has to choose between two allo-
cations of money that affect the decision-maker itself as well
as two other people: one allocation equalises the payoff of
the three players; the other allocation is a Pareto improve-
ment and, consequently, it maximises the sum of the payoffs
of the three players. The other two people do not make
any choice: they are simply paid according to the decision-
maker’s choice.
Here I analyse all the TOG experiments that my collabo-
rators and I have conducted since we introduced this game.
This is a large dataset containing N=6,955 observations, di-
vided in 30 experimental treatments, collected among US
based participants, recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk
(AMT). This dataset offers an excellent occasion to study
gender differences in the trade-off between objective equal-
ity and efficiency, not only because of its largeness, but also
because of the variety of its experimental treatments, which
allows me to explore the role of two potential moderators of
theoretical and practical importance.
3A few more papers explored how people distribute resources in the
context of strategic games, in which the final distribution does not depend
only on the choice of a single individual, but it depends on the profile
of strategies played by two or more players (e.g., Cochard, Couprie &
Hopfensitz, 2018; Zhang, Deng & Zhu, 2017). Although interesting, these
papers do not allow to study gender differences in preferences, because
participants’ actions do not depend only on their preferences, but also
on the beliefs about the behaviour of the decision-makers involved in the
interaction.
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The first moderator is whether efficiency is aligned with
self-interest. In real-life decisions, sometimes, but not al-
ways, the equal choice is costly also for the decision-maker.
Since males are known to be more self-interested than fe-
males, at least in dictator games (Engel, 2011; Rand et
al., 2016; Brañas-Garza et al., 2018), it is important to test
whether gender differences in the trade-off between objec-
tive equality and efficiency, if existing, are actually driven
by gender differences in the weight that people place on self-
versus other-interest. The current dataset is ideal to test
for this moderator, because in 10 out of the 30 treatments
(N=2,619) the equal option is costly for the decision maker.
(See the Method section for details about the payoffs.)
The second moderator is the frame of the trade-off game.
Real-life decision problems, especially in political debate,
are not formulated with a neutral language, but are often
framed with a morally loaded language meant to suggest the
right thing to do. Therefore, understanding whether gender
differences in the trade-off between objective equality and
efficiency, if existing, depend on the moral frame of the
game is of practical interest. The current dataset is ideal also
to test for this moderator, because 10 treatments (N=2,585)
are framed using a language that suggest that being equal is
the right thing to do, whereas 8 treatments (N=1,782) are
framed in such a way to suggest that being efficient is the
right thing to do. (See the Method section for details.)
2 Method
2.1 The Trade-Off Game
As a measure of the trade-off between objective equality
and efficiency, I adopt the Trade-Off Game (TOG; Capraro
& Rand, 2018; Tappin & Capraro, 2018). In the TOG,
one decision-maker has to unilaterally choose between two
allocations of money that affect the decision-maker itself and
two other players. One allocation equalises the payoff of the
three players; the other allocation is a Pareto improvement.
The other two players have no active role and they are only
paid according to the decision-maker choice.
2.2 The dataset
I analyse N=6,955 US based participants recruited on AMT
(females = 46.1%). All these participants played the TOG
as decision-makers. About one month after participation,
they are paid a bonus according to their choice; they also
receive a bonus as recipients in a TOG played with other
two randomly selected participants. To build this dataset,
I started from the 30 TOG treatments for which I have the
data. These are all the treatments that my collaborators and I
have conducted so far, including pilots and failed treatments.
In case of multiple observations (as determined by looking
at the Turk IDs and the IP addresses), I kept only the first
observation (as determined by the starting date of the exper-
iment). Consequently, these 6,955 observations come from
6,955 different Turk IDs and IP addresses. The 30 treatments
can be classified in five main non-disjoint groups, which I
detail below. Non-disjoint means that the same observation
can be classified in different groups. I refer the reader to
Table 1 for a short summary of the treatments.
Trade-OffGames in which efficiency and self-interest are
aligned (10 treatments, N=2,619). The equal allocation is
[13 13 13], that is, each player receives $0.13; the efficient
allocation is [15 23 13], that is, the decision maker receives
$0.15, Player B receives $0.23, and Player C receives $0.13.
Trade-Off Games without the previous “selfish con-
found” (20 treatments, N=4,336). In most treatments, the
equal allocation is [13 13 13], while the efficient allocation
is [13 23 13]. In some treatments (treatments = 23, 24, 25,
26 in the dataset; see Table 1) the available allocations are
[5 5 5] vs. [5 10 5].
Trade-Off games with comprehension questions (9 treat-
ments, N=2,855). Participants are asked two comprehen-
sion questions: (i) “What choice should you make if you
want all players involved to get the same payoff?” (ii) “What
choice should you make if you want to maximize the total
group payoff (i.e., the sum of your bonus plus the bonuses
of Players A and B)?” In the TOGs with comprehension
questions, I include in the analysis only participants who
responded to both comprehension questions correctly.
Trade-Off games in the “equal frame” (10 treatments,
N=2,585). The equal option is presented with a positively
loaded language and/or the efficient option is presented with
a negatively loaded language. The frames have been im-
plemented in several different ways depending on the study.
For example, Capraro and Rand’s (2018) Study 1 labels the
equal choice as the “nice” choice and the efficient choice as
the “non nice” choice. Capraro and Rand’s (2018) Study
3 labels the equal choice as the “more fair” choice and the
efficient choice as the “less fair” choice. Tappin and Capraro
(2018) label the equal option as the “fair” choice and the
efficient choice as “Option 2”. In the same study, another
treatment labels the equal option as “Option 1” and the ef-
ficient option as “unfair”. All these manipulations had the
effect of making participants more likely to choose the equal
allocation. Effect sizes were independent of the particular
manipulation being used. Moreover, Capraro and Rand’s
(2018) Study 4 shows that this labelling technique has the
effect of changing participants’ perception of what is the
morally right thing to do.
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Table 1: List of the studies included in the meta-analysis. More details for each study can be found in the dataset published
along with this article. The column Comprehension is equal to Yes if, in the corresponding study, participants are asked
comprehension questions; the column Selfish is equal to Yes if, in the corresponding study, the efficient option and the self-
interested option are aligned; the other columns are self-explanatory.
Treatment Frame Comprehension Selfish Paper
1 efficient No No Tappin & Capraro (2018)
2 equal No No Tappin & Capraro (2018)
3 equal No No Tappin & Capraro (2018)
4 efficient No No Tappin & Capraro (2018)
5 equal No Yes Capraro & Rand (2018)
6 equal No Yes Capraro & Rand (2018)
7 equal No Yes Capraro & Rand (2018)
8 equal No Yes Capraro & Rand (2018)
9 efficient No Yes Capraro & Rand (2018)
10 efficient No Yes Capraro & Rand (2018)
11 efficient No Yes Capraro & Rand (2018)
12 efficient No Yes Capraro & Rand (2018)
13 efficient No No Capraro, Rodriguez-Lara & Ruiz-Martos (2020)
14 equal No No Capraro, Rodriguez-Lara & Ruiz-Martos (2020)
15 equal No Yes Capraro (2018)
16 efficient No Yes Capraro (2018)
17 neutral Yes No unpublished
18 neutral No No unpublished
19 neutral No No unpublished
20 neutral No No unpublished
21 neutral No No unpublished
22 neutral No No unpublished
23 equal Yes No Capraro, Jordan & Tappin (2020)
24 equal Yes No Capraro, Jordan & Tappin (2020)
25 neutral Yes No Capraro, Jordan & Tappin (2020)
26 neutral Yes No Capraro, Jordan & Tappin (2020)
27 equal Yes No Capraro, Jordan & Tappin (2020)
28 equal Yes No Capraro, Jordan & Tappin (2020)
29 neutral Yes No Capraro, Jordan & Tappin (2020)
30 neutral Yes No Capraro, Jordan & Tappin (2020)
Trade-Off games in the “efficient frame” (8 treatments,
N=1,782). The efficient option is presented with a posi-
tively loaded language and/or the equal option is presented
with a negatively loaded language. The frames have been im-
plemented in several different ways, depending on the study.
For example, Capraro and Rand’s (2018) Study 1 labels the
efficient choice as the “nice” choice and the equal choice as
the “non nice” choice. Capraro and Rand’s (2018) Study 3
labels the efficient choice as the “more generous” choice and
the equal choice as the “less generous” choice. Tappin and
Capraro (2018) labels the efficient option as the “generous”
choice and the equal choice as “Option 2”. In the same study,
another treatment labels the efficient option as “Option 1”
and the equal option as “ungenerous”. All these techniques
had the effect of making participants more likely to choose
the efficient allocation. Effect sizes were independent of the
particular manipulation being used. Moreover, Capraro and
Rand’s (2018) Study 4 shows that this labelling technique
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NOTE: Weights are from random effects analysis
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Figure 1: Forest plot of random-effects meta-analysis of the effect of gender on Trade-Off game choice.
has the effect of changing participants’ perception of what is
the morally right thing to do.
Trade-Off games in the “neutral frame” (10 treatments,
N=2,334). One option is called “Option 1”, the other one
is called “Option 2”.
3 Variables
I define two individual-level variables: equal_choice is a
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the corresponding in-
dividual chooses the equal option in the TOG; female is a
self-explanatory dummy variable. Through these variables,
I build the key treatment-level variables needed for the meta-
analysis: for each treatment, coeff_logit and error_logit rep-
resent, respectively, the coefficient and the standard error of
logit regression predicting equal_choice as a function of fe-
male.4 Apart from these two, there are three more treatment-
4The results remain qualitatively the same when using OLS or probit.
In the paper, I report only the results using logit regression, because the
dependent variable is binary. In the dataset published alongwith this article,
one can find the coefficients and the errors needed for the meta-analysis also
with the other regressions. These are named coeff_ols (coeff_probit) and
error_ols (error_probit).
level variables: efficient_selfish is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if, in the corresponding treatment, the efficient choice
maximises the payoff of the decision-maker; comprehen-
sion is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the corresponding
treatment contains comprehension questions; frame is a cat-
egorical variable equal to 1 if the corresponding treatment is
framed such that the efficient choice is presented as being the
morally right thing to do, equal to −1 if the corresponding
treatment is framed such that the equal choice is presented
as being the morally right thing to do, and equal to 0 if the
corresponding treatment is neutrally framed.
4 Results
As a first step of the analysis, I look at the overall effect of
female on equal_choice. To do so, I conduct random-effects
meta-analysis. The results, shown in Figure 1, clearly show
a significant overall effect such that females prefer objective
equality over efficiency to a greater extent than males do
(effect size = 0.411, 95% CI = [0.248, 0.574], Z=4.94, p <
0.001). There is also significant evidence of heterogeneity
across studies in the true size of this effect (heterogeneity chi-
squared = 61.94, p < .001, variation in effect size attributable
to heterogeneity = 53%).
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Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.023
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Figure 2: Forest plot of random-effect meta-analysis of the effect of gender on Trade-Off game choice across frames.
Next, I test whether these gender differences are robust
after controlling for two potential confounds. The first pos-
sible source of confound is that, in some of the treatments,
the efficient option is alignedwith the payoff-maximising op-
tion. Since previous meta-analyses using the dictator game
found that males are more self-interested than females (En-
gel, 2011; Rand et al., 2016; Brañas-Garza et al., 2018), it is
in principle possible that gender differences in TOG choices
are entirely driven by males being more self-regarding than
females. To exclude this, I use meta-regression to test for
the influence of the moderator efficient_selfish on coeff. The
results show that efficient_selfish significantly affect the size
of the gender effect (coeff=-0.384, p=0.046). However, the
negative coefficient shows that gender differences in the TOG
choices are actually partly driven by the lack of the selfish
confound. Indeed, the effect of gender is lower in the TOGs
inwhich efficiency and self-interest are aligned (overall effect
size = 0.28), compared to when they are not (overall effect
size = 0.51). The residual heterogeneity after accounting for
efficient_selfish is 52%.
The second potential source of confound is comprehen-
sion. Since some of the TOG treatments contain comprehen-
sion questions while others do not, it is crucial to make sure
that gender differences in TOG choices are not driven by
participants not comprehending the decision problem. To
this end, I use meta-regression to test for the influence of
the moderator comprehension on coeff. The results show
that comprehension does significantly affect the size of the
gender effect (coeff = 0.368, p=0.044). However, its posi-
tive sign shows that the size of the gender effect is actually
higher among participants who passed the comprehension
questions (overall effect size = 0.58), compared to those to
whom comprehension questions had not been asked (overall
effect size = 0.32). The residual heterogeneity after account-
ing for comprehension is 50%.
I now move to the moderating role of framing the TOG
using loaded language in such a way to suggest that one
option is morally better than the other one. Since frame is
a categorical variable, here I use subgroup meta-analysis,
where the groups are defined by frame values. The forest
plot in Figure 2 shows that the gender effect in TOG choices
is higher in the equal frame (overall effect size = 0.60), com-
pared to the neutral frame (overall effect size = 0.37), and the
efficient frame (overall effect size = 0.23). Between groups
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heterogeneity is statistically significant (p=0.023), suggest-
ing that the gender effect in TOG choices does significantly
differ across TOG frames. Looking at gender differences in
TOG choices within each frame, the overall gender effect is
marginally significant in the efficient frame (overall effect
size = 0.225, 95% CI = [−0.018,0.468], Z=1.81, p=0.070),
and highly significant both in the neutral frame (overall ef-
fect size = 0.372, 95%CI = [0.296,0.539]), Z=4.38, p<0.001)
and in the equal frame (overall effect size = 0.602, 95% CI
= [0.441,0.764]), Z=7.31, p<0.001).
Finally, I conduct ameta-regression to explore the effect of
all three moderators together (efficient_selfish, comprehen-
sion, and frame). Here, only frame is marginally significant
(coeff = −0.194, p = 0.084). The residual heterogeneity after
accounting for all three moderators is 48%.
5 Discussion
To summarise, I reported the largest-to-date analysis of gen-
der differences in the trade-off between objective equality
and efficiency: N=6,955 (unique) observations collected
among US based Turkers using the Trade-Off game (Capraro
& Rand, 2018; Tappin & Capraro, 2018) as a measure of
the trade-off between objective equality and efficiency, and
divided in 30 treatments. The resulting meta-analysis pro-
vided evidence that females prefer objective equality over
efficiency to a greater extent than males do.
The meta-analysis also provided evidence of some het-
erogeneity among treatments. Part of this heterogeneity is
explained by whether: (i) self-interest is aligned with effi-
ciency; (ii) participants passed the comprehension questions;
and (iii) the TOG options were framed with loaded instruc-
tions. Specifically, I found that gender differences are partic-
ularly strong when self-interest is not aligned with efficiency
(indicating that gender differences are not simply driven by
males being more self-interested than females); they are par-
ticularly strong among participants who responded to the
comprehension questions correctly (indicating that gender
differences are not simply driven by participants not under-
standing the game); and are particularly strong when par-
ticipants play the TOG in the equal frame (suggesting that
framing the instructions in such a way to make the equal
allocation salient has the effect to further increase existing,
baseline, gender differences – note that gender differences
are present also in the neutral frame and, to a smaller extent,
in the efficient frame). However, when exploring the effect
of all these moderators together, it turns out that only frame
has a marginally significant effect.
As detailed in the Literature Review section, some earlier
papers have explored gender differences in resource allo-
cations. However, only a handful of them have focussed
on the trade-off between objective equality and efficiency,
specifically. Some of them found females to prefer objec-
tive equality to a greater extent than males do, but others
found no gender differences, or did not report gender dif-
ferences. Therefore, although previous literature seems to
suggest that females prefer objective equality to a greater
extent than males do, the evidence was relatively weak. The
current analysis, based on almost seven thousand unique ob-
servations, provide a strong test (and confirmation) of this
hypothesis.
Related to the current study is also the literature on gender
differences in judgments in hypothetical moral dilemmas.
Previous research suggests that females are more averse than
males to physically harm one person for the greater good
(Fumagalli et al, 2010; Friesdorf et al, 2015; Capraro &
Sippel, 2017). Although related, the current study differs
from this line of research in two main dimensions: first, it
involves no physical harm (and no economic harm); second,
it concerns actual behaviour and not moral judgments in
hypothetical dilemmas.
This work has, nevertheless, several limitations. The first
one is that the dataset does not contain observations in which
objective equality benefits the decision-maker. Since males
are known to be more self-regarding than females (Engel,
2011; Rand et al., 2016; Brañas-Garza et al., 2018), the
obvious prediction is that gender differences in the trade-off
between objective equality and efficiency would decrease,
and perhaps even reverse, if the equal allocation becomes
beneficial for the decision-maker. Future work could test
this hypothesis.
Similarly, a second limitation is that the dataset does not
contain observations in which efficiency harms one of the
players involved in the interaction. Exploring gender dif-
ferences in this situation would be an important extension,
because, in reality, efficiency often harms worse-off players.
Previous research suggests that females are more averse than
males to physically harm one person for the greater good
(Fumagalli et al, 2010; Friesdorf et al, 2015; Capraro &
Sippel, 2017). Although it is not obvious that gender dif-
ferences in physical harm map onto gender differences in
economic harm, this might suggest that, in case efficiency
harms one of the players, gender differences in the trade-
off between objective equality and efficiency might increase.
Future research could test this prediction.
The third limitation concerns the stakes of the TOG,
which, in all the treatments, are relatively small. Previ-
ous work suggests that stakes have little effect on people’s
behaviour in a number of economic games involving pro-
sociality, at least when stakes are not too high (Forsythe et
al., 1994; Carpenter, Verhoogen & Burks, 2005; Johansson-
Stenman, Mahmud & Martinsson, 2005; Brañas-Garza et
al., 2018; Larney, Rotella & Barclay, 2019); other studies
have indeed found evidence that pro-sociality decreases at
very high stakes (Carpenter et al., 2005; Andersen, Ertacç,
Gneezy, Hoffman & List, 2011). To the best of my knowl-
edge, there have been no studies exploring the stake effect on
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the trade-off between objective equality and efficiency. Test-
ing whether this trade-off varies as a function of the stakes
and, if it does so, testing how this variation interacts with
gender is an interesting direction for future research.
The fourth limitation is that this dataset does not allow to
answer the question of why females prefer objective equality
over efficiency to a greater extent than males do. At this
stage of research, I can only speculate. An influential line of
literature suggests that gender differences in behaviour are
partly due to the different roles that males and females tend
to occupy in society (Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Wood, 1999).
Along these lines, one potential explanation for the current
findings is that, from childhood to adolescent, females and
males start differentiating their social roles, with females
going to cover, on average, roles involving resource distribu-
tions, while males going to cover, on average, roles involving
the creation of resources. With such a role division, it would
be optimal to create resources efficiently (in order to max-
imise the total resource to be distributed) and then divide
them equally (in order to minimise within-group conflicts).
This logic could explain why adult males and females tend
to display, on average, different preferences for resource dis-
tribution. Note that this framework is consistent with the
theory developed and tested by Choshen-Hillel and Yaniv
(2011, 2012), according to which agency is positively cor-
related with efficient choices. Exploring this and potentially
other explanations is an important avenue for future research.
In sum, this work shows that females, on average, prefer
objective equality over efficiency to a greater extent than
males do. Future work should explore the causes and the
boundaries of this effect.
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